Fund managers respond to the payoff gradient by continuously adjusting leverage in our analytic and simulation models. The base model has a stable equilibrium with classic properties. However, bubbles and crashes occur in extended models incorporating an endogenous market risk premium based on investors' historical losses and constantgain learning. When losses have been small for a long time, asset prices inflate as fund managers increase leverage. Then slight losses can trigger a crash, as a widening risk premium accelerates deleveraging and asset price declines.
Introduction
Since their origin, financial markets have suffered from sporadic bubbles and crashes-episodes in which asset prices rise dramatically for no obvious reason, and later plummet (e.g., Penso de la Vega, 1688 Vega, /1996 Mackay, 1841 Mackay, /1996 . Recent examples include Japan's stock and land price bubbles in the late 1980s, and the US dot.com and telecom bubbles in 2000. Such episodes are important as well as dramatic. As shorelines and river valleys are shaped largely by ''100 year events,'' so are financial markets, and the economy more generally. For example, the US Securities and Exchange Commission, the segregation of commercial banking from investment banking, and active monetary policy all arose in reaction to the 1929 US stock market crash and subsequent Great Depression (e.g., Kindleberger, 1978 Kindleberger, /1989 Kindleberger, /2000 .
Despite their intrinsic interest, financial bubbles and crashes as yet have no widely accepted theoretical explanation. One reason is simply that they are so sporadic. They seldom recur in the same country or market sector within the same generation of participants, so the data are problematic. A second reason is that established theoretical models maintain the assumption of financial market equilibrium. That assumption is difficult to reconcile with the dramatic episodes.
The present paper introduces new models and techniques for studying bubbles and crashes. The focus is on professional fund managers whose payoffs are the risk-adjusted returns they earn on their portfolios. Payoff maximization is not well defined outside equilibrium, so we assume that the managers continuously adjust their risk exposure so as to move up the current payoff gradient. Another non-standard feature is constant-gain learning (e.g., Cho et al., 2002) , also known as exponential average expectations. An endogenous cost of risk is obtained from applying such learning to realized losses. Our model was also influenced by recent mathematical literature. Drawing on the work of Freidlin and Wentzell (1984) , evolutionary game theorists such as Young (1993) and Kandori et al. (1993) showed that some particular transitions among multiple equilibria are much more likely than others in the presence of low-amplitude noise. Sargent (1999) used similar methods to show that even when there is a unique equilibrium, there can be some particular ''dominant escape path'' that temporarily takes the economy far away from equilibrium. See Williams (2004) for a general exposition.
Contents lists available at
The key ingredient is constant-gain learning: the weight assigned to the most recent observations remains constant over time. Such perpetual learning is optimal in an environment where unobserved parameters drift over time, but not in a stationary environment (where the optimal weight goes to zero as experience accumulates). Of course, the parameters of an economy will typically shift over time when participants are learning, so constant-gain learning tends to justify itself. It often approximates actual human learning (e.g., Cheung and Friedman, 1997) . As we will see in Section 4.1, constant-gain learning is implemented by taking an exponential average of historical data, a common practice among financial analysts. Yahoo Finance, for example, routinely displays exponential average returns at various gains.
There is an analytic downside, however. As Williams (2004, p. 10) notes, ''in most cases even the simplest specifications require numerical methods for solution.'' For that reason, our models are primarily computational.
Agent-based computational finance has grown rapidly in recent years; LeBaron (2006) and Hommes (2006) each survey more than 100 papers. In this approach, financial markets are modelled as interacting groups of learning, boundedly rational agents, and behavior is described mainly by running computer simulations rather than by solving equations or proving theorems. Hommes begins his survey with the analytic model of Zeeman (1974) , which used catastrophe theory to characterize periodic financial market crashes. The dynamics arise from the interaction of two trader types, called fundamentalists (who buy when B ¼ P À Vo0 and sell when B40) and chartists (who buy when P increases and sell when it falls). More recent papers introduce more trader types and explicit learning or evolution, and often try to match quantitative empirical regularities. For example, the Santa Fe Artificial Stock Market (Arthur et al., 1997) uses the genetic algorithm (Holland, 1975) so that agents explore a large finite (discrete) space of technical strategies. With a sufficiently slow update rate the market price converges to fundamental value, while with faster update rates it does not converge and exhibits realistic features such as high trading volume, clustered volatility and leptokurtotic returns distributions. Brock and Hommes (1998) is another prominent example of the genre. They model evolutionary competition among two to four simple linear forecasting rules, and obtain chaotic price fluctuations. The last part of Hommes's survey discusses what happens as the number of active forecasting strategies (or trading rules) gets large; again, there can be chaotic price fluctuations. See also De Fontnouvelle (2000) and Brock et al. (2005) for other examples of complex dynamics arising from information and learning processes.
A base model
This section first lays out and justifies the main static elements of the model. Next it presents the basic dynamic elements, and notes the steady state equilibria. Then it presents simulations illustrating the stability of equilibrium.
Portfolios and managers' objectives
To begin, assume that there is a single riskless (''safe'') asset with constant return R 0 and a single risky asset with variable return R 1 . Standard theoretical literature often refers to the risky asset as the market portfolio or the unit beta portfolio. The safe asset can be thought of as insured deposits or government securities.
The agents in the model are portfolio managers, 1 each of whom chooses a single ordered variable x 2 ½0; 1Þ that represents the leverage on the risky asset. Thus x ¼ 1 means fully invested in the risky asset, while x41 means leveraged investment (borrowing the safe asset) and xo1 means that the fraction 1 À x of the manager's funds are invested in the safe asset. 2 The manager's portfolio has size zX0.
Let F denote the cumulative distribution of choices x, weighted by portfolio size. Then the mean choice among portfolio managers (i.e., normalized asset demand) isx ¼ R 1 0 xFðdxÞ ¼ R 1 0 xf ðxÞ dx, where the middle expression is a Stieltjes integral and the last expression is valid when F has a density f .
For a given realized yield R 1 on the risky asset, the manager obtains gross return R G ðxÞ ¼ ð1 À xÞR 0 þ xR 1 . The manager's cost of funds is the risk free rate R 0 plus a risk cost cðxÞ. Two standard interpretations are that the risk cost reflects variance aversion, or the concavity of investors' utility functions. Two alternative interpretations are that an insurance agency (e.g.,
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1 The US financial sector currently comprises about $43.5 trillion of financial assets, of which households (and non-profit institutions) hold about $40.5 trillion (US Flow of Funds Accounts, December 7, 2006, Tables L.1 and L.100) . Several large pieces, including many sorts of deposits and noncorporate equity, are not traded in financial markets. Most of the tradeable assets are professionally managed. These include the largest piece, about $11.6 trillion in pension funds, as well as $4.6 trillion in mutual funds and $1.1 trillion in life insurance reserves. Only $5.3 trillion is held directly in corporate equities, of which a large (but undocumented) part is also managed professionally. Fund managers also dominate two of the most rapidly growing segments, private equity and hedge funds.
2 The constraint xX0 says that fund managers cannot short the market portfolio as a whole. This constraint could play a role in the some of the extensions discussed in Section 5, but appears to be inconsequential in the basic model. the FDIC) charges a premium which increases in the expected loss claims, or that investors self-insure. All four interpretations seem consistent with the specifications to follow. The risk cost up to second order is cðxÞ
Under the maintained assumption of negligible trading costs it turns out that cð0Þ ¼ c 0 ¼ 0 and c 0 ð0Þ ¼ c 1 ¼ 0 (see Section 4.2), while c 2 ¼ c 00 ð0ÞX0 can be interpreted as the market price of risk (see Section 3.4). In the basic model c 2 is an exogenous constant, but it can vary in extensions of the model. Either way, the net return RðxÞ enjoyed by a manager choosing leverage x is the gross return less the risk-adjusted cost of funds, so
The manager's objective or payoff function f depends positively on the net return. Extensions of the model allow it also to depend on the portfolio size and on relative performance, but the basic model ignores such complications and simply sets fðx; FÞ ¼ RðxÞ:
The current distribution F of choices by managers affects managers' payoff via the R 1 term in (1), as explained next.
Asset price and return
The fundamental value V of a share of the asset is the present value of the per share earnings, i.e., revenues less economic costs, including the reinvestment costs necessary to maintain growth but excluding the rental rate of owned capital. Thus earnings are the residual cash flow available to the owners of the underlying real assets. In this simple model, earnings are synonymous with dividends, profit, return to capital, and net cash flow.
In the basic model, earnings are a continuous stream that grows forever at a constant rate g s . Future earnings are discounted at some rate R s 4g s , discussed below. The number of shares is normalized so that per share earnings are 1.0 at time 0. The initial fundamental value is the integral of the discounted earnings stream, Vð0Þ
. At time t40 the fundamental value is similar except that the earnings stream starts at e g s t , so
Asset supply comes from fundamental-oriented market participants such as issuers of stocks and bonds, and perhaps individual investors. We do not model them in detail, but simply assume that the net asset supply function has constant elasticity a40 so, after suitable normalization, it is S ¼ ðP=VÞ a . Normalized asset demand by fund managers is, as already noted, D ¼x. Solving S ¼ D, we can write the price of the risky asset as
where a ¼ 1=a40. Thus asset price is equal to, less than or greater than fundamental value whenever normalized demandx for the risky asset is equal, less than or greater than 1.0. An interpretation is that the fund managers exert buying pressure whose intensity is parametrized by a.
It is now straightforward to calculate R 1 , the return on the risky asset. By definition, it is the dividend yield plus the capital gains rate. The dividend yield is simply earnings per dollar invested, e g s t =PðtÞ ¼ ðR s À g s Þx Àa . Use the notation _ y ¼ dy=dt and take the log-derivative of (4) to obtain the capital gains rate
Hence the realized yield on the risky asset is
The first term is the dividend yield, the second term captures capital gains due to economic growth, and the third term reflects capital gains due to financial market activity. Note that R 1 is higher when mean leveragex is lower or is increasing more rapidly. It is equal to the discount rate R s whenx ¼ 1 and is steady. What is the discount rate R s ? One component is the riskless rate R 0 X0, which reflects investors' marginal rate of time preference. We write
where the term d R X0 represents all other factors. These factors include g s , since economic growth is known and economywide, and we impose the constraint R s À g s 40 to ensure that fundamental value is well defined in (3).
Gradient dynamics
As noted in the Introduction, neoclassical financial models assume that asset prices are always in equilibrium. Agents in such models choose portfolios to maximize the expected present value of terminal wealth, or utility. Expectations are well defined given a known equilibrium price path (possibly stochastic), but it is hard to reconcile such knowledge with bubbles and crashes. Our approach is instead to specify how agents adapt to any price history, equilibrium or not, and to find conditions under which the process leads towards or away from equilibrium.
So how might a portfolio manager adjust leverage x, given payoff RðxÞ? For discrete unordered choices, the standard process is replicator dynamics (e.g., Fudenberg and Levine, 1998) , but when the choice variable x is continuous and ordered as here, mean field or gradient dynamics are standard (e.g., Sonnenschein, 1982; Aoki, 2004; Friedman and Ostrov, 2008) . Gradient dynamics are especially natural for fund managers, since they adjust leverage x mainly by selling or buying the risky asset. To the extent that the risky asset is not perfectly liquid, the per-share trading cost increases with the net amount traded in a given short time interval. If the increase is linear, then the adjustment cost (net trade times per share trading cost) is quadratic. It turns out that such quadratic adjustment costs are the key condition to obtain exact gradient dynamics (Friedman and Yellin, 1997 , Proposition 1), rather than approximate gradient or sign-preserving dynamics.
We shall assume gradient adjustment without explicitly modelling trading frictions, since the frictions presumably are small relative to realized returns in (1). Thus portfolio managers continuously adjust their leverage choice x, moving up the payoff gradient at a rate _ x ¼ dx=dt proportional to the slope f x ¼ qf=qx. Normalizing the rate to 1.0 gives us the expression
To obtain population-level dynamics in simplest form, assume for the moment that the fund does not retain the gross return but instead passes it through to its clients, who never withdraw or invest additional funds. Then the fraction Fðx; tÞ of managed funds that have leverage x or less changes at time t only because managers are adjusting their leverage. The rate of change F t ¼ qF=qt is simply the density F x ¼ qF=qx of funds with leverage x times their (downward) adjustment speed Àf x . Thus we obtain the master equation 
Appendix B begins with a generalization of (8) that permits retained earnings, distributions with mass points, and other complications.
Plugging (1) and (5) into (2), we obtain the fund manager's payoff function
with gradient
Equilibrium
We focus on symmetric steady states of (8), i.e., states that do not change over time and in which all fund managers choose the same leverage x ¼x. To put it more formally, we seek degenerate stationary solutions to the master equation: for all tX0, Fðx; tÞ ¼ 0 for xox and Fðx; tÞ ¼ 1 for xXx. Allowing retained earnings fortunately does not change the analysis.
In steady state we must have f x ¼ 0 and, of course, _ x ¼ 0 at that point. Inspection of (10) shows that one possibility is that c 2 ¼ 0 and x ¼x ¼ 1 for all fund managers, so (5) collapses to R 1 ¼ R s ¼ R 0 and (1) collapses to RðxÞ ¼ 0 8x. This trivial equilibrium makes sense when there really is no risk.
One obtains a more interesting symmetric steady state at x ¼x when the marginal risk cost c 2 x equals the marginal steady state net return
We now show that there is a unique such steady state x Ã , and derive expressions for how it varies in the underlying parameters c 2 , a, g s , R 0 and d R .
Proposition 1. Given fixed positive parameters c 2 , a, g s , R 0 , and Appendix A contains a formal proof and specific formulas for the comparative statics; here we just give the intuition. The key condition is that the payoff gradient is zero at (10), and rearrange slightly to obtain
As shown in Fig. 1 , the right hand side of (11) is a ray from the origin with positive slope c 2 . The left hand side is a hyperbola with the y-axis as the vertical asymptote and the line y ¼ g s À R 0 as the horizontal asymptote. Clearly there is a unique point of intersection x Ã 40.
, it is not difficult to show that x Ã ¼x41 and P4V when c 2 40 is sufficiently small. Here the high steady state asset price P reflects fund managers' desire to leverage their portfolios given the low risk cost. Likewise, larger values of the c 2 parameter imply x Ã ¼xo1 and PoV. There is some intermediate value of c 2 such that mean leverage isx ¼ 1 and P ¼ V. One can see from (10) or (11) that this implies R s ¼ R 1 ¼ R 0 þ c 2 . In this ''long-run'' equilibrium, c 2 looks like the standard risk premium, e.g., the market price of risk in the Capital Asset Pricing Model.
Implicitly differentiating (11) with respect to parameters such as c 2 , one obtains expressions such as
o0. The last expression shows that increasing c 2 always decreases x Ã by some proportion.
The proportion is larger when c 2 is small and x Ã is large. The next section shows that when c 2 is endogenous, this proportional effect leads to bubbles and crashes. But first we present a simulation model that confirms the symmetric equilibrium even when earnings are retained and time is discrete. The model also illustrates the stability of the symmetric equilibrium and provides a benchmark for assessing the impact of endogenous risk premiums.
Simulation results
Using Netlogo (http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/), we created a simulation model that closely parallels the basic analytical model just presented. Sliders allow the user to select parameter values and display options. Full documentation as well as executable code can be found at http://www.vismath.org/research/landscapedyn/models/markets/.
In brief, the simulation consists of fund managers i ¼ 1; . . . ; M whose leverage x i (horizontal coordinate) and portfolio size z i (vertical coordinate) are floating point numbers that adjust in discrete time. The simulations drop the unrealistic pass-through assumption on earnings and instead assume that managers retain all earnings (and absorb any losses). The user chooses the frequency (daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, or annual) and the number of time steps per period (up to 64). With N steps per year, the managers' annual returns R are computed as in Eqs. (1)- (5) and are adjusted to r ¼ ð1 þ RÞ 1=N À 1 per time step. labelled ''population''. 3 The ''step'' button allows the user to see one time period (e.g., week) at a time, while the ''go'' button allows the simulation to proceed steadily. Other display options are controlled by green sliders, as explained in the on-line user's manual. The tan graphs and monitors display simulation results.
In the sample simulation, the managers move smoothly towards x Ã % 1:08 and maximal z, as asset price (displayed on the screen as DPM or detrended PM) converges to 1:08 2 =ð0:06 À 0Þ % 19:4. The figure shows that they are fairly close within two decades. Proposition 1 suggests smooth convergence towards a symmetric choice at x Ã and associated asset price P Ã , and not just for the case shown in Fig. 2 , but for a wide range of parameter values. To test this suggestion, we moved each of the five main parameters in turn, up to a rather high (but still admissible) level, and down to a rather low level, e.g., c 2 ¼ 0:01; 0:20 compared to the baseline c 2 ¼ 0:05. For each configuration we ran 10 weekly simulations each for 100 years. Table 1 shows the steady state predictions, and the observed results (dropping the first 20 years, which depend more on arbitrary initial conditions). In every case the observed standard deviation becomes quite small and the observed mean is quite close to the steady state prediction.
Endogenous risk
Dynamics become more interesting when the risk cost c 2 is endogenous. To that end, we incorporate into our basic model three new features suggested by the empirical evidence and by the KMK perspective.
Streaks, losses, and learning
The first new feature is that each manager has streaks in which she underperforms or outperforms the market. The idea is that different portfolios with the same leverage can have different realized returns; some managers temporarily are luckier (or more attuned to new opportunities) than others. Thus, instead of receiving the uniform return in (1), manager i receives net return
The manager's idiosyncratic component i is Ornstein-Uhlenbeck, i.e., mean reverting in continuous time. 4 If the most recent known value is i ðt À hÞ, then the current value is the random variable for some given volatility parameter s40 and decay parameter t40, and an independent realization n from the unit normal distribution (Feller, 1971, p. 336) . Baseline values are s ¼ 0:20, roughly the historical annualized volatility on the S&P500 stock index, and t ¼ 0:7, implying a half-life of about 1 year for the idiosyncratic component.
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The second new feature is loss aversion, where loss is defined as negative gross return.
is the gross return that manager i currently earns on her portfolio, her loss is L i ¼ maxf0; ÀR Gi g, the shortfall from zero. Constant-gain learning is the third new feature. Investors seem to judge managers by the overall historical track record, with greater emphasis on more recent results. 6 The natural formalization is an exponential average. In continuous time the exponential average loss for manager i iŝ
where the parameter Z is the memory decay rate. Using the definition (14) and a little calculus, the reader can verify that over a time horizon h in which L is constant (or only observed once), the exponential average is updated from the previous exponential average lossL i ðt À hÞ as follows:
Update rule (15) defines ''constant-gain learning'' with gain ð1 À e ÀZh Þ. We now specify perceived risk c 2 as proportional to market-wide perceived losses,
where the parameter b40 reflects investors' sensitivity to perceived loss, andL T ðtÞ is the perceived lossL i ðtÞ averaged 
Equilibrium
Steady states in the current model are more intricate than in the base model. The new parameters for memory decay ðZÞ and sensitivity to losses ðbÞ help determine the risk cost c 2 , and it (along with the streak decay ðtÞ and volatility ðsÞ parameters) affects the perceived losses. As a first step towards characterizing steady states, the next proposition computes expected (hence, in steady state, perceived) loss for given c 2 .
Proposition 2. In steady state with given c 2 , a manager with leverage x incurs expected loss qðxjc 2 Þ ¼ ðxs= ffiffiffiffiffi ffi 2t p Þcðz 0 ðxÞÞ, where
The ''wedge'' function c is the definite integral of the cumulative unit normal distribution F; see Appendix A for an explicit formula and a proof of the proposition.
Corollary. The expected loss is zero and has derivative zero at x ¼ 0. It is a convex increasing function for x40.
The Corollary justifies the approximation first used in Eq. (1) that the risk cost cðxÞ is quadratic with cð0Þ ¼ c 0 ð0Þ ¼ 0. The intuition is that a tiny exposure to the risky asset requires at most a second order tiny amount of insurance, because portfolio returns will be in the vicinity of the safe return R 0 and outright losses are virtually impossible. The proof of the Corollary in Appendix A works even when an arbitrary distribution function replaces F in the formula for c, and the net return contains an arbitrary risk premium. The specific formulas of Proposition 2 come from the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, but the qualitative features are rather general. 
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5 Loss aversion is a staple of the new behavioral finance literature; see for example Shefrin (2002) and Camerer et al. (2003) . But finance theorists and practitioners have always known that investors respond more to downside risk (or losses) than to variance per se; see for example Levy and Markowitz (1979) . 6 Investors in mutual funds chase returns, especially those funds that recently were top performers (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Karceski, 2002) . Pension funds are less extreme in chasing top performance, but are harsher on funds that incur losses (Del Guercio and Tkac, 2002) . Chevalier and Ellison show that fund managers, especially those of new funds, respond by increasing their risk stance when their returns trail their peers'. Sirri and Tufano note that the cross-sectional effects are supplemented by an industry effect: inflows/outflows from the equity mutual fund sector respond to bull and bear markets. Their estimates imply that inflow drops 70% in an average recession and increases 50% following an average bull market run. 
Dynamics
Of course, the distribution clumped at x
ÃÃ cannot be an exact solution of the model with s40, since the model is stochastic. The real question is whether the actual distribution remains nearby. To answer that question, we incorporate the new features into the simulation described in the previous section. Fig. 3 shows typical asset price behavior in the extended model with idiosyncratic returns and an endogenous price of risk, using the baseline parameter values.
In the simulation, the managers circulate constantly, mostly in the range 0oxo3, but their average fluctuates around x ÃÃ % 0:866. Asset price usually bounces around the predicted steady state value
ð0:06Þ À1 0:866 2 % 12:5, but occasionally it rises much higher or falls much lower.
The simulation software allows us to re-examine dramatic price movements after they occur, using the rewind button. The first simulation tried while writing this passage used baseline parameter values. The asset price P rose to 14:74P ÃÃ ¼ 12:5 by the end of year 12, and year 13 began with the managers somewhat extended atx ¼ 0:9440:866 ¼ x ÃÃ . Losses had begun to increase, and c 2 rose modestly from 6.2% at the beginning of the year to 9.0% by April. At that point, P began to decline at an accelerating pace. By the end of that unlucky year, the market was in free fall with c 2 approaching 100% and P half its former value. The market bottomed out in the first quarter of year 14 with P under 3 andx below 0.4. A gradual recovery then brought P near P ÃÃ ¼ 12:5 by year 21, where it hovered for the next several decades. Dissecting dozens of similar examples suggests that the most likely way to leave the vicinity of the steady state begins with a streak of good luck for a few of the larger traders. In the absence of very bad luck for most other traders, asset price P exhibits a steady to rising trend. If the trend persists, the perceived lossL T ðtÞ declines and so does the risk premium c 2 . As shown in Fig. 1 , this increases x Ã and, as managers increase their average risk stancex, it also increases P. Asx gets large relative to x ÃÃ , the effect attenuates, and then the market is vulnerable to a streak of moderately bad luck for some of the larger investors. Once P starts to decline, the process goes into reverse and accelerates. Returns turn negative and losses mount, so c 2 rises and x Ã declines, dragging down P and leading to more negative returns and losses. The vicious cycle slows when x Ã gets so low that it becomes relatively unresponsive to further increases in c 2 (recall Fig. 1) . Asx stabilizes at a low level, returns turn positive, perceived losses decline, and P gradually heads back towards its steady state value x ÃÃ .
Statistical results
To investigate these impressions, we examined 18 variants of the baseline parameter configuration. As in Table 1 , we ran 10 centuries of weekly simulations for each variant. To maintain comparability over time and across simulations with different growth rates, we work with detrended asset price, replacing P by Pe Àg s t . Somewhat arbitrarily, we defined a crash as a decline in detrended P of at least 50% from its highest point within the last half year. (By comparison, the maximum drawdown of the Nikkei index was a bit less than 50% from December 1989 to September 1990, so it did not quite crash by our definition. Likewise, the initial decline in Nasdaq from its 5048 peak in March 2000 was less than 50%, but the index fell 59% from September 2000 to March 2001, which does meet our definition of a crash.) Table 2 reports the results. Under baseline parameters, average asset price and risk position are modestly higher than predicted by the symmetric steady state, and crashes occur on average only once every other century. Changing the population size has no effect on the steady state predictions, but it does change the simulation averages slightly, and has a ARTICLE IN PRESS substantial effect on crash frequency. Raising population size to 100 virtually eliminated crashes, while lowering it to 15 tripled their frequency. Recall that the (detrended) fundamental value is V ¼ ðR s À g s Þ À1 , so the direct effect of a shift in either the R 0 or the d R component of the discount factor R s is a shift V in the opposite direction. The table shows that these direct effects on predicted (detrended) asset price P ÃÃ are partially offset via x ÃÃ . Actual average P barely responds to R 0 but tracks the d R predictions fairly well, and crash frequencies shift modestly in the expected direction. The underlying growth rate parameter g s operates similarly, except that the impact via x Ã reinforces the impact via V, and the average price when g s ¼ 0:4 is considerably higher than the already high forecast and has a very high standard deviation.
Recall that the unconditional variance of a manager's luck is s 2 =ð2tÞ. Lowering the instantaneous volatility s to 0.05 reduces the risk cost and substantially raises steady state risk stance x ÃÃ and price P ÃÃ , and the actual averages stay rather close to these predictions. Raising the decay rate t to 3 produces roughly similar predictions and actual results. Raising s to 0.40 moves everything in the opposite direction, and increases crash frequency and variability slightly above the baseline. The most interesting exercise here is lowering the decay rate to 0.1. The symmetric steady state prediction reflects the greater risk arising from the 7 year half-life of luck. However, in the simulations we see large, long-lived bubbles punctuated by occasional crashes (17 over the observed millennium), resulting in extremely high and variable risk stance and asset price. Results for the remaining three parameters are also dramatic. When investors have a long memory (low gain), crashes disappear and prices are steadier (and a bit higher) than in the baseline. With short memories (high gain, half-life about 3 months), serious crashes hit every couple of decades. Changes in b, investors' sensitivity to realized losses, affect predicted and actual performance in the direction one might expect but not as strongly; the direct effect on risk cost is partially offset by endogenous response via x ÃÃ . Finally, the predicted impact of the elasticity or price pressure parameter a is as one might expect, while the actual impact is somewhat stronger. In particular, crashes are frequent and prolonged when a ¼ 4. Note: Baseline values are as in Fig. 3 . Mean AE standard deviation entries are taken over 10 centuries of weekly observations.
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Summary and interpretation
The simulation results suggest that Model 1 has three distinct modes of behavior. The first mode, stable convergence, is similar to behavior in Model 0. From reasonable initial states, the market converges to a neighborhood of the symmetric steady state and remains there. Lucky (or unlucky) streaks are not large enough to break away. Parameters conducive to this mode include a large population M, low volatility s, high decay rate t for luck, and a low Z. In terms of the KMK perspective, the last parameter suggests that investors are not easily dazzled and the other three suggest that unusual opportunities (modelled as positive individual luck) are small and fleeting relative to the size of the market.
Convergence in this first mode often is to prices and risk positions somewhat higher than in the symmetric steady state prediction. Apparently the prediction is biased to the extent that managers are heterogeneous rather than symmetric. In the simulation, the luckier managers tend to have larger portfolios z and choose larger x than in the symmetric steady state, pushing up weighted average risk position x Ã and asset price P. A second behavioral mode, occasional bubbles and crashes, can be seen even in the baseline configuration. (The symmetric steady state prediction ignores crashes, which tends to offset the biases due to ignoring heterogeneity and bubbles.) As described in Section 4.3, this mode is reminiscent of escape dynamics as well as the KMK perspective. It prevails for moderate parameter values, covering most of the range a priori considered plausible.
A third behavioral mode, violent thrashing, prevails for some extreme parameter configurations. For example, with very large a or Z, the observed asset price is usually far above the symmetric steady state value or far below, with rapid and erratic transitions. Normalcy is rare in this mode.
Discussion
We use simulations, supplemented by some analytics and statistics, to explore a perspective on financial market bubbles and crashes originating in the writings of Keynes, Minsky and Kindleberger (KMK) . We begin with Model 0, a base model featuring a gradient process by which fund managers adjust the riskiness of their portfolios.
Model 0 is very stable. Analytic results suggest, and simulations confirm for a wide range of exogenous parameters, that the asset price converges quickly and reliably to a level proportional to the fundamental value. The proportion is a decreasing function of the risk cost parameter c 2 . The model never bubbles or crashes.
Model 1, an extension of Model 0, features an endogenous risk premium driven by constant-gain learning. It also has a unique steady state, but its dynamics are quite different. Although asset price usually is near its steady state value, there are recurrent episodes in which it rises substantially (typically 20-50% above normal levels) and then crashes (often to a third or less of normal levels within a few months). Such episodes occur over a wide range of ''realistic'' parameter values.
The episodes become rarer when parameter configurations give investors longer memories or give fund managers smaller (or more fleeting) streaks of luck. In opposite configurations the episodes become more common and, with extreme parameter values, normalcy becomes rare.
The occasional bubble and crash episodes seem related to escape dynamics, which identifies the ''particular most likely way'' in which the economy temporarily leaves the vicinity of a steady state (Williams, 2004, p. 7) . However, Model 1 lacks the linear structure and explicit belief formation of the macrotheory literature, and its continuous action space puts it outside the evolutionary game theory literature cited in Section 2.2. It seems that new efforts, well beyond the scope of the present paper, are needed for analytic characterization of Model 1 dynamics.
Model 1 seems to vindicate the KMK perspective. It seems clear that bubbles and crashes would only be intensified by incorporating other realistic features emphasized by KMK, such as the heterogeneous expectations, rank-sensitive managers, and exogenous shifts in economy-wide growth opportunities.
Much work remains. One can extend Model 1 to incorporate such realistic features and, as noted in Appendix B, we have already included many of them in a Model 2. Preliminary results for Model 2 are encouraging but followup work is required. Also, other realistic features await exploration.
The most important task, however, is cross-validation. Simulation models are most valuable when they work in tandem with analytic results, empirical studies and/or experiments with human subjects. We hope that our work inspires new analytical, empirical and experimental work that deepens understanding of bubbles and crashes.
Appendix A. Mathematical proofs Proposition 1. Given fixed positive parameters c 2 , a, g s , R 0 , and Proof. We first show that Eq. (11) has a unique solution x Ã . Rewrite the equation as
Note that U is a continuous real valued function which is positive (indeed unbounded) as x & 0 and is negative as x ! 1. Hence by the Intermediate Value Theorem, UðxÞ ¼ 0 at some intermediate value x Ã . Since U 0 ðxÞ ¼ ÀaðR s À g s Þx ÀaÀ1 À c 2 o0 for all x 2 ð0; 1Þ, it follows that UðxÞ ¼ 0 has at most one solution, i.e., x Ã is unique.
The next step is to show that (17) is necessary and sufficient for a symmetric (degenerate) solution to the master equation. That step proceeds exactly as in Friedman and Ostrov (2008, Proposition 2) . It is omitted here because it requires several technical details tangential to the concerns of the present paper.
The master equation ignores the impact of retained earnings, which affect the growth rates of the weights z ¼ f ðxÞ at different values of x; see Eq. (20). Here we consider only distributions clumped at a single point so retained earnings have no impact and the master equation holds without modification.
To complete the proof, write (17) with respect to the given parameter and solve to obtain
Inspection shows that x Ã is increasing in a and in g s and decreasing in R 0 iff x 
The last expression in (18) is obtained via integration by parts. The graph of c lies slightly above the graph of the simple wedge function wðxÞ ¼ maxf0; xg.
Proof. Recall that a loss is defined as the shortfall from 0 of gross returns,
The unconditional distribution of i (obtained as the h ! 1 limit in (13)) is normal with mean 0 and standard deviation s= ffiffiffiffiffi ffi 2t p . Drop the nonsteady state term in (5) to obtain R 1 ¼ ðR s À g s Þðx Ã Þ Àa þ g s . Plug this into the expression above for R Gi to conclude that its
That is, gross returns can be expressed as r ¼ m þ sz where z is a unit normal random variate. Since gross returns are negative for realizations of z that fall below
Corollary. The expected loss is zero and has derivative zero at x ¼ 0. It is a convex increasing function for x40. 
The Corollary is true in considerable generality. The normality assumption plays essentially no role, nor do specification details for z 0 ðxÞ. The proof works with minor modifications as long as the tail probability FðzÞ is oð1=zÞ as z ! À1, which holds for all distribution functions F commonly used in the literature.
Appendix B. Model extensions and robustness
B.1. Modified master equation
Let Zðx; tÞ denote the total value at time t of all managed portfolios with leverage px, and let ZðtÞ ¼ Zð1; tÞ denote the overall total value. The distribution described in the master equation is just its normalization Fðx; tÞ ¼ Zðx; tÞ=ZðtÞ. When the overall total ZðtÞ is not constant over time, the master equation becomes 
Here subscripts denote partial derivatives, and Zðx; tÞ includes birth and death rates as well as the fickle investor effects in (22). To verify, differentiate the identity Fðx; tÞ ¼ R y 0 Z x ðy; tÞ dy=ZðtÞ in the case that Zðx; tÞ has a density. For other cases (where there are mass points), take limits of cases with a density.
B.2. Logit regression
We drew 248 random parameter vectors from the uniform distribution on the truncated rectangle 1pap4, 1pbp5, 0:1pZ, tp3, 0:05psp0:4, À0:04pg s p0:04, 0:01pR 0 , d R p0:05, R s ¼ R 0 þ d R 4g s , with population kept constant at M ¼ 30.
For each parameter vector we simulated a century of weekly data. We dropped centuries with more than 20 crashes, since the parameter vector in that case seems to lie outside the relevant region. A supplementary regression (available on request) suggests that the 20-crash rule is roughly equivalent to imposing the parameter constraint À15:5d R þ 6g s þ 9s À 1:5t þ 0:6Z þ 0:2b þ 1:4ap4:6.
The dependent variable in Table 3 is crash-lagged, an indicator (binary valued). When a crash is detected at week t, i.e., the detrended asset price DPMðtÞ is less than half its maximum over weeks ft À 1; . . . ; t À 26g, then Crash-laggedðt À 12Þ ¼ 1. That is, the dependent variable approximates the start of the crash by saying it occurred 12 weeks before the crash is confirmed. The explanatory variables in the logit regression consist of the parameter vector, quadratic terms in the vector components, and RDPM-M, a real-valued variable. In week t, RDPM-M is the ratio of the current detrended asset price, DPM, to its mean value over years 30-100. (The first 29 years are affected by the initial conditions.)
To interpret the RDMP coefficient, suppose that the initial probability of a crash is 1%, so initial log odds are lnð0:01=0:99Þ % À4:6. The coefficient estimate of 5.11 implies that, other things equal, were asset price P to rise 20%, then the log odds would increase by about 0:2 Ã 5:11 % 1:0 to À3:6, implying a crash probability of p ¼ e À3:6 =ð1 þ e À3:6 Þ % 2:7%, i.e., the probability would increase by about 170%.
We checked robustness by running regressions with asset price normalized by fundamental value V instead of the mean value, with more or less stringent definitions of crashes, and with the dependent variable lagged more or fewer periods than 12. The results are all roughly similar; in some specifications the R 0 and b coefficients gain significance, often at the expense of the price coefficient or the a or t coefficients. The coefficients on asset price tend to be a bit smaller when using V, but they typically remain quite significant economically and statistically. We initially considered all quadratic as well as all linear parameter terms, but Table 3 retains only the most significant quadratic terms.
The coefficient estimates generally confirm earlier conclusions: crashes are more likely with lower d R ; g s and t, and with higher s; Z and a. The quadratic coefficients indicate that the initially strong impact of s and the negative impact of t both taper off when s is towards the upper end of its range. They also indicate that b's impact becomes positive when Z is larger, and the negative impacts of g s and t tend to offset each other. The asset price coefficient indicates that crashes are considerably more likely when asset prices are high. As explained in appendix, the estimate of about 5.1 implies that a crash probability of 1% would more than double if, other things equal, the asset price increased by 20%.
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B.3. Extension: fickle investors
Managed funds routinely reinvest positive returns and seldom ask investors to cover negative returns. Hence, other things equal, the fund grows at the fund's gross rate of return, viz.,
More importantly, as noted in the empirical facts section, investors chase returns. Managers with large perceived losseŝ L i ðtÞ and small perceived returns should lose investors, and those with small losses and large returns should gain. This can be formalized in many ways. For simplicity and consistency with available evidence, we say that the defection rate is proportional to the perceived loss. Thus the outflow rate is _ z O i =z i ¼ ÀdL i , where the defection parameter dX0 reflects how strongly investors respond by withdrawing part or all of their funds. The outflow of funds initially goes to a pool z 0 not allocated to any fund manager. Recruitment of new investors depends on relative perceived returns. Recycle the exponential average technique from (14) and apply it to net returns in (12) to get perceived net returns,
ÀZðtÀsÞ R i ðsÞ ds.
The empirical papers cited at the end of Section 2 suggest that a disproportionate share of new investment goes to managers with the very best perceived returns. To capture this effect, we use a logit specification, with fund inflows
proportional to e lR i rather than toR i itself. When the logit parameter l ¼ 0, inflows are unrelated to perceived returns, and larger values of the parameter indicate greater sensitivity to relative performance. The inflow rate is also proportional to z 0 , the pool of funds available for investment. Thus we obtain the following expression for fund inflows: _ z I i =z i ¼ rz 0 e lR i . In the current version of the simulation, the parameter r40 is inversely proportional to the sum (or integral) over managers of e lR i , so the overall outflow rate is constant from the unallocated pool z 0 . To capture the actual tendency of investors to allocate more funds in bull markets, the parameter r could be made less responsive to the sum of the e lR i . Putting the three terms together, the overall rate of increase in fund i in Model 2 is
B.4. Scale effects, exit and entry, and more
As noted at the end this Appendix, evidence suggests that large size tends to depress a manager's returns. We can accommodate that feature by including a quadratic penalty for risk exposure xz i . Thus net returns in (12) become
where the default value of parameter k is 0.01. That is, a standard size fund fully invested in risky assets incurs costs of 1% per annum. Funds do not last forever, especially hedge funds. They tend to liquidate when investors leave. One could make the hazard rate a smoothly decreasing function of size or growth rate, but to keep things simple we simply decree a minimum size z LIM , and say that fund i disappears (with its funds going to the unallocated pool z 0 ) whenever z i oz LIM . Otherwise the firm survives.
New funds appear occasionally, especially when the pool of unallocated funds is large. To keep things simple, we count the number of funds liquidated over the last year, and at the beginning of the new year we create the same number of new funds. The size z and initial risk stance x of each new fund is independently drawn from the uniform distribution on
, where x SS is the steady state leverage in Proposition 1 given the current price of risk c 2 .
Model 3 incorporates effects for size (''gravity'') and entry and exit. Since the total mass of investor funds is no longer constant, the master equation must be modified slightly. This is spelled out in Appendix B. Models 2 and 3 exhibit bubbles and crashes similar to those of model 1.
Further extensions of the model have been contemplated but not implemented so far. One could include a Markov process that occasionally shifts the underlying state of the economy s. For example, there could be three states (say poor, good and great) and phase 1 of a KMK bubble could be touched off by a transition to the great state, with maximal g s . Another extension would include other realistic components of the fund manager's objective function (2) that reflect absolute size or relative vs. absolute returns and losses. It might then be possible to explore the impact of contrarian strategies and short-selling.
Fund managers care about relative as well as absolute performance. The Wall Street Journal publishes rankings four times a year, and agencies such as Lipper Analytics and Morningstar do so more frequently. Higher rank brings managers larger bonuses and more competing job offers, and also increases their compensation by attracting more investment inflows.
On the other hand, large size tends to depress a manager's returns. Chen et al. (2004) find that a 2 standard deviation increase in fund size implies that annual returns decline by almost a percentage point. The reasons include illiquidity (it is more costly to redeploy a large portfolio than a small one) and some sorts of organizational costs.
Appendix C. The KMK perspective Minsky (1975) and Minksy (1982) , drawing on themes of Keynes (1936) , developed a distinctive view of bubbles and crashes, later elaborated in Kindleberger (1978 Kindleberger ( /1989 Kindleberger ( /2000 . Although never fully formalized, this KMK perspective helps identify features of financial markets that can make them vulnerable to bubbles and crashes.
The KMK perspective can be summarized informally as a sequence of phases. Phase 0 is normalcy. Financial market participants share a broad consensus on the earnings prospects for tradeable assets. Asset prices closely track fundamental values, and investors earn normal returns, commensurate with perceived risk.
Phase 1 begins when an unusual opportunity arises, financial or real. Two famous early examples: some investors saw tremendous profit opportunities for selling strikingly colored varieties of tulips to rising middle class families in early 17th century Netherlands. The South Sea Company seemed poised in the early 1720 to purchase the British national debt, opening unprecedented financial opportunities. More recently, in the late 1980s innovative Japanese car and consumer electronic manufacturers gained world leadership in efficiency and quality; and in the late 1990s the rapid rise of the Internet created a variety of new business opportunities.
Normally, shared experience leads to rough consensus on the value of available opportunities. However, opportunities sufficiently different from earlier events-the unusual opportunities-can easily lead to a divergence of opinion. Optimists may think the unusual opportunity will lead to once-in-a-lifetime profits for those who seize it, while pessimists may believe that it will produce normal profits at best. Well-known Internet optimists included Mary Meeker and Henry Blodgett, who predicted that dozens of startup companies would each be worth hundreds of billions of dollars. Pessimists (including most economists) argued that, although the Internet might attract a substantial share of commerce, it would tend to lower profit margins and that few of the startup companies would ever generate much shareholder value.
Phase 2 begins if and when the optimists reap impressive profits. For example, the market value of Netscape shares increased sixfold in 5 months from the initial offering in August 1995. Such returns attract trend-following investors, who in turn attract financial innovators. Venture capital firms mushroomed in the late 1990s, inundated by new investors, and day trading became popular.
Optimists get the new investment inflows. The flip side, often overlooked, is that pessimists either play along or else get left out. One of the authors observed top managers at major US bank during the energy boom of the late 1970s as they decided whether to expand energy lending, despite warnings that the sector was overextended. The clinching argument was that the bank had to make the loans to remain a major player. Perhaps the classic example is Sir Isaac Newton his role as Master of the Mint. The immortal physicist sold the Mint's South Sea shares at a decent profit in April 1720 but then came under increasing to match other investors' returns. In midsummer, he bought a large block of shares just as the bubble reached its maximum. The point of Keynes' famous beauty contest metaphor and comment on ''levels of play'' is that sophisticated pessimists should sometimes mimic optimists.
Crucially, asset quality deteriorates as the bubble inflates. Recent experience encourages some investors to pay high prices for promises that can only be fulfilled in good times, and financial market innovators offer a ready supply of such promises. ''Sub-prime'' home loans are a recent example: the borrower has little equity, and will be able to make promised payments only if home prices continue to rise briskly and refinancing remains easy to obtain. The financial innovations and lending standards induced by a bubble tend to make the financial sector increasingly vulnerable to unfavorable developments.
Phase 3 begins when the supply of dazzled new investors and financial innovation is exhausted, as must happen eventually in our finite world. A minor event then can touch off a cascade, as implicit (or explicit) defaults trigger further defaults and losses. It is hard to remember what event in March 2000 ended the runup of the NASDAQ index to over 5000, or what stopped Japan's Nikkei index just short of 40,000 in January 1990. But once asset prices started to decline, many leveraged investors had to sell, and the decline accelerated. Such declines corrode collateral, and borrower defaults can cause lender defaults, so a financial crash can be contagious. Phase 3 generally runs faster than phase 2.
A national or international recession may result. In modern jargon, the KMK story is that Phase 3 financial distress increases uncertainty, which increases the value of deferral options. Real investment therefore declines as financial distress spreads, and multiplier effects produce a recession. Countercyclical monetary and fiscal policies are intended to prevent such recessions, or reduce their severity, by shielding basically sound organizations from contagion and reducing uncertainty.
Phase 4 begins when asset prices are so low that savvy investors purchase again and the ''bear market bottoms out.'' The NASDAQ was a good buy at 1200 in Summer 2002. With effective bankruptcy laws, the losses accrued in phase 3 are quickly parcelled out, productive assets are redeployed, and recovery begins promptly, e.g., as in the US following the Savings and Loan debacle of the 1980s. Consensus beliefs return, and financial assets are again grounded in reality. Phase 0, normalcy, begins anew and often lasts for decades.
By contrast, a protracted political struggle ensues when it is unclear who must bear the losses accrued in a crash, 9 as in Japan recently, or in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s. Phase 4 then can be quite long and painful. (The Great Depression of the 1930s arguably involved inept countercyclical policy as well as inadequate bankruptcy laws.) In our interpretation, the KMK perspective rests on a learning process distorted by financial market imperfections. Abraham Lincoln was right that you cannot fool all the people all the time, but you can fool lots of them occasionally. Once a bubble starts inflating, financial markets give investors little economic or psychological incentive to slow it down. The eventual crash completes the learning process, and innoculates investors. Hence bubbles tend not to repeat themselves: it takes a rather different novel opportunity, probably much later or in some distant location, to touch off the next episode.
